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Abstract 
Deregulation, re-regulation and continuing globalisation embody an imperative that banks 
increase efficiency to survive. We employ non-parametric bootstrap DEA to measure 
technical efficiency among Jamaican banks between 1998 and 2007.  In addition, we test for 
conditional convergence to identify pointing variables for technical efficiency. Overall, the 
results suggest that there has been a tendency towards improvement in bank efficiency levels 
for the largest banks.  The findings show strong evidence of conditional convergence, which 
means that each bank is converging to its own steady-state and that GDP growth, ownership 
and size are the major influences on levels of technical efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
The expectation is for an intensely challenging period in world financial systems as a result 
of the US-led fallout in financial entities, the full impact of which remains to be seen.  As in 
other parts of the world, the recent turmoil in global financial markets has raised some 
fundamental questions for Jamaica:  Are banks operating at a level that will secure their 
survival in the face of a worldwide financial crisis?  Has the battery of methodologies 
employed by regulators been sufficiently reinforced since the crisis of the 1990s to 
effectively handle the global challenges?     
The Jamaican banking sector of today is largely the legacy of unprecedented financial 
crisis during the last decade of the twentieth century and has undergone many changes 
consequentially.  The crisis resulted in a transformation of the sector in terms of number, 
types, and ownership of banks.1  In addition, regulatory amendments imposed by the central 
bank, and reporting changes imposed by an amended Companies Act and Jamaica’s adoption 
of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have also had, as expected, significant 
impact of the reported performance of banks (see, for example, Daley, 2003).  
While the explanations for Jamaica’s past banking problems vary, there is tacit 
consensus that the macroeconomic environment as well as bank size, ownership and 
operational efficiency were among the most significant factors contributing to the failure of 
banks.  We make a rigorous attempt to measure efficiency relative to best practice to answer 
this question: what statistical inference can we draw from point-estimates of efficiency 
provided by the use of bootstrapping technology?  In other words, are measures of relative 
efficiency provided by Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) significantly different from the 
benchmark for the panel of Jamaican banks over the period 1998 to 2007?  In our 
investigation of the post-crisis efficiency levels of individual Jamaican banks we implicitly 
                                                 
1 The number of banks was reduced due mainly to regulator-initiated closures and mergers. 
 
 
3 
address whether the hypothesis of greater correlation between efficiency and increased 
foreign ownership holds true for Jamaican banks.   
We address the presumption that a sound regulatory framework can serve as a 
bulwark from instability and engender increased operational performance within banks by 
implicitly investigating whether the profusion of post-crisis enhancements to the regulatory 
and supervisory framework is evidenced in improved operational efficiency among Jamaican 
banks.  Specifically, has the regulatory reform focused on transparency and accuracy of non-
performing loans (NPLs) influenced greater efficiency within banks? We examine this is by 
the inclusion of NPLs, and also isolating NPLs as a bad output, in one of the frontier models.  
Another benefit of our paper is the information it provides from tests of convergence 
specified on the bank efficiency estimates. Utilising the concept of ß-convergence borrowed 
from the growth convergence literature, we examine for conditional convergence among 
banks in the sample frame. In testing for conditional convergence within peer groups (bank 
categories) we address the question: are banks converging to a steady-state or are they 
diverging? In other words, are the less efficient banks catching up with the more efficient 
ones and, if so, what are the variables that point to movements in efficiency levels?   
Generally speaking, the findings are indicative of improvement in efficiency for the 
largest banks. There is strong evidence that the banks are converging, not towards the same 
steady-state as benchmark efficient banks but, rather, towards a steady-state that is 
conditional on each bank’s own level of efficiency. 
The next section contextualises Jamaica’s banking sector. Section 3 reviews the 
literature on bank efficiency for developing countries and the DEA methodology. Section 4 
discusses model strategy and data. Section 5 presents the results, including a discussion of the 
convergence tests and section 6 concludes. 
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2. Efficiency and Jamaica’s banking sector in context 
Jamaica’s banking environment has changed markedly over the last decade.  In the early 
1990s following a period of deregulation in the financial sector, there was a proliferation of 
banks in the island: 37 by 1993 of which 30 were locally owned.2 However, a weak 
institutional and regulatory framework, regulatory forbearance and internal weaknesses 
within banks resulted in high levels of non-performing loans, poor capitalisation and 
inefficiency (Daley, 2007).3  By January 1997, the government was forced to intervene to 
mitigate the effects of a system-wide crisis.4  Daley (2007) reports the following table as 
evidence of the trend in the 21 banks that failed over the decade of the 1990s for commercial 
and merchant banks in Jamaica.5 
Table 1 Bank Failures in Jamaica – Selected years by type of bank 
Year end 1994 1996 1997 1998 
Commercial banks - 1 3 1 
Merchant banks 1 1 1 13 
Source: Daley (2007). 
 
Evidently, 61% of the failures are grouped in one year. Daley (2007) argues that the 
peculiar features of the failed banks played a more significant role in the event of failure than 
did the ‘macro’ factors during that year that would have affected all banks.  According to 
Daley et al. (2008) ‘… the likelihood of failure in any year, t, is significantly related to the 
…the level of efficiency with which management conducts its affairs in t-3 and in t-1 …’ 
(p.295).  The importance of the inefficiency variable in discriminating between failed and 
non-failed banks are highlighted in their findings.   
Of course, there are significant potential welfare gains from efficiencies within the 
banking sector.  The finance-growth nexus suggests strong positive correlation between 
                                                 
2‘Banks’ refer to deposit-taking entities that may be commercial banks or merchant banks. As a consequence of continual 
restructuring within the Jamaican banking sector, 5 of the 6 commercial banks operating at the end of 2007 had majority 
foreign ownership. 
3 Efficiency (or inefficiency) in this instance was measured by a higher ratios of expenses to income. 
4 See, for example, Duncan and Langrin (2004), Tennant (2006) and Daley (2007) for more detailed discussions of the crisis. 
5 Failure is defined to include closure, bailout and regulator-induced or supervised mergers. 
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financial market development and economic growth in developing countries where banks are 
the primary intermediary, as capital markets tend to be thin and not well developed (see, for, 
La Porta example et al., 1998).  The events taking place both within and outside of the 
Jamaican banking sector since the 1990s dictate the need for continued focused attention and 
examination of those factors that are significant correlates to banks’ performance and 
ultimately banking and financial sector system stability.  
Jamaican banks may have been further challenged by the effects of unregistered 
financial organisations (UFOs).  UFOs refer to a group of unregulated investment clubs that 
compete with the traditional banking sector by offering clients supernormal returns.6 Perhaps 
the potentially most debilitating impact on the formal banking sector is any non-performing 
loans resulting as the clubs collapse and the funds are not returned to the traditional banking 
market; bank efficiency becomes an even greater imperative since spreads cannot be 
increased infinitely in order to maintain or improve profitability. 7  
The efficiency optimisation imperative is acknowledged and, indeed, well-understood 
in Jamaica, where efficiency is increasingly emphasised as a priority in performance targets.8  
Unfortunately, banking efficiency in Jamaica remains under-researched.  This is probably due 
to the relatively small number of banks and the inaccessibility to high-quality bank-specific 
data.  While several authors make reference to efficiency in relation to bank spreads (for 
example, Tennant, 2006) or bank failure (Daley, 2007; Daley et al., 2008), Bailey (2006) is 
the only known study to have specifically examined efficiency in the Jamaican banking 
sector between 2005 and 2006.  We contribute to the literature on banking efficiency in 
developing countries by examining the efficiency of Jamaican banks at the firm level 
                                                 
6 Anecdotal evidence suggests that returns ranged from 120% to 240% per annum and that the UFOs reflected financial 
liabilities that were of a magnitude equal to or greater than traditional bank deposits. The Sunday Gleaner, March 30, 2008 
(p. G2), reported a total of 19 such unregistered organisations operating in Jamaica (these schemes are also referred to as 
alternative investment schemes).  Since that time, they have all disappeared. 
7 Tennant (2006) discusses the issue of interest rate spreads and the link to efficiency. 
8 See, for example, http://www.firstcaribbeanbank.com/uploads/pdf/2004_3rd_jamaica.pdf, 
http://www.sun.com/software/cluster/NB-Jamica.pdf 
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between 1998 and 2007.  This is the first work to our knowledge to examine efficiency in 
banking using non-parametric bootstrapping technology and to perform a test of convergence 
on bank efficiency for Jamaica.   
3. Bank efficiency literature and methodology 
Tennant’s (2006) examination of interest rate spreads in Jamaica argues that interest rate 
spreads act as ‘a key indicator of [an] institution’s efficiency’ (p.88), and reports from a 
survey of Jamaican financial sector stakeholders that recorded high spreads have been 
attributed to inefficiency, inter alia.  Consequently, he notes the perception that increased 
operational efficiencies can help to reduce bank spreads. 
According to Bailey (2006), technical efficiency for the Jamaican banking sector in 
general declined during 2006 relative to 2005.   A Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) was 
applied to quarterly data for the period December 2004 to December 2006 and resulted in 
average technical inefficiency of 25.7% and 9% for commercial and merchant banks, 
respectively, in 2006 relative to 4.1% and 2.0%, respectively, in 2005. 
Not surprisingly, extensive research has been conducted on bank efficiency using data 
for the United States of America.  However, there is also a growing body of literature for 
developing countries with an increasing number of studies conducted using data for transition 
economies in Europe, for Pakistan, Ind ia and China (see, for example, Berger et al., 2009 for 
a brief survey). Generally speaking, the empirical findings relating to bank ownership and 
efficiency are mixed.  Berger et al. (2009:115) note that: ‘The most common findings for 
developing nations are that on average, foreign banks are more efficient than or 
approximately equally efficient to private [non-state] domestic banks. …there are variations 
on all of these findings.’  
We discern two approaches to measuring bank efficiency.  From an accounting 
perspective, bank efficiency has been traditionally evaluated by a cost-to- income ratio, 
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defined as: 
    NIIII
C
ER
+
=
    (1) 
where C is non-interest expenses, II is net interest income and NII is non-interest income.9 
Indeed, empirical research on bank efficiency has also utilised this relatively simple ratio.10 
Many Jamaican banks use an accounting ratio akin to this to monitor efficiency. 11  Arguably, 
while ratios are useful and do give some indication of the level and changes in efficiency over 
time, they represent a final outcome and do not allow identification of the sources of any 
inefficiency and where improvements are necessary.  Moreover, Berger et al. (2009:116) 
caution that: ‘Ratio analyses do not control for individual bank outputs, input prices, or other 
exogenous factors facing banks in the way that studies using modern efficiency methodology 
do, and so may give misleading results.’ 
The alternative approach is neoclassical production theory, which has become 
increasingly common in empirical analyses. In this case, a bank is assessed as an economic 
unit and managers have the option of evaluating efficiency by considering multiple inputs 
and outputs and also of decomposing cost efficiency into allocative and technical efficiency. 
Perhaps it is as a result of the heterogeneity of the outputs and inputs related to banks 
why there is a lack of consensus in the literature as to their precise classifications.  
Consequently, the intermediation and production approaches are often utilised as 
classification guides. The intermediation approach assesses deposit-taking entities as 
financial intermediaries that utilise labour and capital to transform deposits into loans and 
other earning assets; the production approach is predicated on the entity as a producer of loan 
and deposit services from labour and capital (see, for example, Drake, 2003).  The choice of 
                                                 
9 See the United States Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
http://www.ffiec.gov/PDF/UBPR/06UBPRS31.pdf 
10 Li et al., (2001) utilise ratio analysis to compare bank performance in China and Forster and Shaffer (2005) for Latin 
America. 
11http://mycmmb.com/docs/SMW/SMW%202006/February%202006/SMR090206.pdf, 
http://www.jncb.com/corp_info/news.asp?Story=275, http://www.capital-credit-mbank.com/viewnews.aspx?ID=60  
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approach may alter the  efficiency scores obtained but not the qualitative conclusions (see, for 
example, Berger et al., 1997). 
The above approaches are now associated with conducting empirical research on 
banking efficiency utilising frontier parametric and non-parametric techniques. The 
parametric approaches impose a structural form on the data and are subject to criticism.  
Despite certain drawbacks, non-parametric approaches are commonly used since they avoid 
the restrictions of a defined functional form and infer the results from the banks’ output 
directly.    
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a mathematical programming technique 
grounded in the principle of benchmarking and seeks to identify the most efficient entity 
based on a ‘frontier’ of efficiency constructed over the data  using the data in the sample 
(Coelli et al., 2005).12  Because DEA provides an objectively determined numerical 
efficiency value, Berger and Humphrey (1997:2) suggest that it may be ‘particularly valuable 
in assessing and informing government policy regarding financial institutions.’  The standard 
DEA model outcome for efficiency is a value between 0 and 1 (0% and 100%) indicating the 
degree of efficiency from least to fully technically efficient (Coelli et al., 2005).  
A technically efficient bank is one that cannot produce more outputs with the given 
vector of inputs or the same set of outputs with fewer inputs. Let there be N banks. Let ix  
represent the input matrix of the ith bank and iy  represent its output matrix. Let the KxN input 
matrix be denoted as X and the MxN output matrix be denoted by Y. The efficiency measure 
for each of the N banks is maximised by the DEA searching for the ratio of all weighted 
outputs over all weighted inputs where the weights are selected from the dual of the linear 
programming problem conventionally represented as: 
                                                 
12 The basis of DEA is an extension by Charnes et al. (1978) who popularised the method.  Other commonly applied 
techniques are the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), the Distribution-Free Approach (DFA) and the Thick-Frontier 
Approach (TFA). 
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     qlq ,min  
     0³+- fYy i       (2) 
 
subject to                                            0³- fq Xx i       (3) 
     0³f  
where f is a N x 1 vector of constants (reflecting the number of banks), q is a scalar and is the 
economic efficiency score of the ith bank (0 < q < 1).   
The advantage of unconstrained functional parameters allows the DEA flexibility to 
construct a linear frontier of relative efficiency by ‘enveloping’ the banks within the sample, 
with the ‘best practice’ banks forming the frontier.13 However, a key drawback of this 
technique is that data are assumed to be measured perfectly and no allowance is made for 
random error due to luck or measurement error.  For example, a deviation above the cost 
frontier would be attributed completely to inefficiency, rather than to a combination of 
inefficiency and random error (Drake, 2003). 
We hypothesize, consistent with the extant literature, that post-crisis regulatory 
enhancements leads to greater efficiency, and that the larger banks are more efficient as are 
banks with greater foreign ownership.  We therefore report the efficiency of banks generally 
as well as by bank categories.  In addition, we seek to identify whether there is discernable 
convergence among peer groups.  
To test our hypotheses we employ variations of the intermediation approach using 
DEA with bank-specific financial accounting information to identify how well a bank is 
expected to perform relative to other banks under the same exogenous conditions, utilising a 
weighted bundle of inputs to produce the same weighted bundle of outputs.14 
 
                                                 
13 We use banks here but the same principles would apply to any other decision-making unit (DMU). Coelli et al. (2005:199) 
note that this flexibility is superior to parametric methods but note that ‘… this aspect … can also create problems, especially 
when dealing with small data sets.’ The caution is of particular importance in this study with a maximum of 12 banks for 10 
years. 
14 The issue of relative efficiency is stressed and the ‘smoothing’ of accounting data may results in measurement errors that 
renders absolute measures misleading. 
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4. Measuring bank efficiency: model strategy and data 
Given the relatively virgin research ground in Jamaica, there is the potential to construct 
different models of varying specifications and sophistication that could be useful to a variety 
of policy decisions relating to banks.  However, our final models – both in number and design 
– were determined by data availability. We utilise the full population of banks that existed 
during the period 1998 to 2007 for the models summarised in Table 2 as the first stage of our 
two-stage approach.  
Model 1 has the income flows of a bank as the output. The traditional measure of 
bank income is interest income, but many banks de-emphasise the less profitable ‘plain 
vanilla’ banking function, promote a broader role and emphasize a wider range of services. 
Model 2 sees output as the traditional items on the balance sheet and the position of other 
investments (typically government and corporate liquid assets). Since interest income will be 
positively correlated with the outputs of model 2, the main difference between the two 
models will depend on the weight of non- interest income to interest income in a specific 
bank. Model 3 differs from model 2 in that it takes performing loans as an output so as to 
give zero weight to NPLs. We would expect the results of model 2 to be close to model 3 if 
NPLs are not large. Model 4 treats NPLs as a bad output so that maximising output is the 
same as minimising NPLs. 
The choice of 2 inputs and 2 outputs is dictated by the dimensionality problem with 
DEA.15 First, we test and compare the performance results for the banks, using the 
specifications of DEA outlined in Table 2. Efficiency scores for each bank is first estimated 
using the standard intermediation approach, followed by a bootstrap procedure to each of the 
above frontier models.16  The bootstrap procedure is based on the notion that if the data can 
be viewed as a random sample from an underlying population under a model, then the 
                                                 
15 Because of the small number of data points available we could only use the 2-input, 2-output. As a rule of thumb the 
number of data points must exceed 3x(number of inputs + number of outputs). 
16 By ‘standard’ here we refer to how the estimation is conducted: that is, without the bootstrapping. 
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process of continuous random draws from the sample under the model generates also random 
draws from the population. 17  It affords statistical inference and thereby corrects for this 
weakness in the standard DEA models. The conventional DEA estimates are biased 
uncorrected and can give a misleading picture of the performance of the banks. Berger and 
Humphrey (1997:10) note that ‘A resampling technique, such as bootstrapping, is one way of 
obtaining an empirical approximation to the underlying sampling distribution of DEA 
efficiency estimates. Once the underlying distribution is approximated, statistical inference 
can be conducted.’ We generate 2,000 bootstrap efficiency scores for each bank in each 
year.18   
Table 2 Two-stage Modelling Strategy 
NON-PARAMETRIC DEA 
(standard and bootstrap)  
MODEL DESCRIPTION 
 
Model Inputs Outputs 
Model 1 1.Operating Costs  
2. Deposits 
1. Total Net Interest 
Income 
2. Non-interest income 
Model 2 1.Operating Costs  
2. Deposits 
1. Gross Loans 
2. Investments 
Model 3 1.Operating Costs  
2. Deposits 
1. Gross Loans – NPL 
(net) 
2. Investments 
 
Model 4 1.Operating Costs  
2. Deposits 
1. Net Loans + 
Investments  
2. NPL (bad output) 
 
We test our hypotheses using annual audited unconsolidated financial data for all 
Jamaican banks during the period 1998 to 2007 as available.19 Data were obtained from 
publicly available resources, including Bankscope, financial statements and Annual Reports, 
the website of the respective banks, the website of the Central Bank, and media reports.20  
Notably, all the banks now use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to report 
                                                 
17 For a brief description of the bootstrapping procedure, see Simar and Wilson (2000). 
18 Hall (1986) suggests 1,000 bootstraps to ensure adequate coverage of the confidence intervals.  
19 Unconsolidated means that other group company data are excluded. 
20 Bankscope database is a resource providing financial and other data for over 29,000 banks all over the world. 
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financial information. 21 Data was not consistently available for all entities and, in a few 
instances a number of working assumptions had to be made to fill gaps in the data.22  In the 
final analysis we used an unbalanced panel of 12 banks with 101 bank-year observations. We 
feel that it is reasonable to assume that the weighted median efficiency scores for the majority 
of banks are indicative of the efficiency levels of each bank relative to other banks and do not 
believe that the lack of a balanced panel refutes the value of our findings.  
5. Empirical Results 
We investigate the levels of technical efficiency between 1998 and 2007, and compare the 
standard DEA with the bootstrap results.  Appendix A shows selected frontier analyses 
results.  Column 1 indicates the individual banks, while columns 2-5 give the standard DEA 
estimate, the bias-corrected bootstrap median and the 95% confidence intervals for the bias-
corrected efficiency estimates, respectively. The overall results (including those not reported) 
show independence between the efficiency scores from the bootstraps and the standard DEA. 
The statistical significance at the 95% level of confidence suggests that the DEA results 
reflect significant bias.23 We can therefore conclude that the bootstrap results provide 
superior results to the DEA and focus our attention on the median bootstrap results from this 
point.24  
Overall, there are three key results from the frontier analysis in Appendix A.  First, it 
is clear that there is wide variation in banking efficiency scores among Jamaican banks 
between 1998 and 2007.  In 1998, the scores ranged between 34.24% for CCMB and 84.33% 
for FGB while in 2007 they ranged from 64.44% for CITIBANK to 94.69% for BNS (model 
                                                 
21 IFRS was adopted or all financial reporting on or after July 1, 2002.  Some financial statements have therefore been 
reported using the superseded local accounting standards (Local GAAP). Daley (2004), and Daley (2003), for example, 
discuss the likely impact of the change. 
22 While these assumptions are ‘conditioning’ factors that should be taken into account when interpreting the results, they are 
not pervasive and are also in line with other researchers’ assumptions.  
23 The results are also significantly different from unity 
24 We report the median rather than the mean since the former should provide a more robust measure of location in skewed 
distributions such as this (see, for example, Simar and Wilson, 1998). The complete DEA-bootstrap comparison is available 
from the authors on request. 
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1). According to model 1, this suggests that even if substantial differences remain in banks’ 
efficiency levels in 2007, these differences have in fact decreased over the period.  All other 
models suggest that the differences have increased over the period.   
The second key result is somewhat intuitive from the first: from Appendix A, model 
1, shows all banks increasing in efficiency over the period, model 4 shows all banks 
decreasing in efficiency over the period and for models 2 and 3 RBTT and FCIB are the only 
banks that reflected increasing efficiency over the period.  Further, there is no evidence of the 
least efficient banks in 1998 catching-up to the more efficient banks by 2007 except for 
modest movements by CCMB in model 1.  
Third, while the inclusion of NPLs as a bad output in model 4 appears to have had a 
generalised effect of lowering overall efficiency levels for most banks, there is a noticeable 
further sharp decrease in 2002 for almost all banks in all models.  Sharp decreases were also 
evident in 2005.  These relatively low levels of efficiency are indicative of significant 
features having an impact on the data that point to potential structural breaks.  It will be 
recalled that in 2002 Jamaica adopted IFRS for accounting year-end on or after July 1.  
Anticipated increased volatility in earnings and some balance sheet items has been noted by 
Daley (2003), for example.  Notwithstanding, an examination of the impact of IFRS on bank 
reporting represents a potential area for future research.   
Table 3 shows the year-by-year correlation coefficients between each model as a test 
for consistency and robustness. The results of table 3 are mixed.  Except for a few years, 
there is no consistent and significant positive relation between model 1 and any of the other 
3. There is a significant positive relation between model 2 and model 3 which is not a 
surprise as in model 2, one of the outputs is total loans and in model 2 it is total performing 
loans. However, there is a reasonable number of positive significant correlations between 
model 4 and models 2 and 3 (14 out of 20) at the 10% level. While it is well known that DEA 
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can give different results for different combinations of inputs and outputs, the correlations 
show that for the same input set, there is a relatively robust correspondence of scores from 
models 2, 3, and 4. 
Table 3: Correlation coefficient between models by year 
Year  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1.0000    
.0381 1.0000   
.0987 .9877*** 1.0000  
1998 Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
Model 4 -.3046 .7405** .6917** 1.0000 
1.0000    
.5521* 1.0000   
.5972* .9747*** 1.0000  
1999 Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
Model 4 .1546 .5201* .5700* 1.0000 
1.0000    
.0025 1.0000   
.1174 .9457*** 1.0000  
2000 Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
Model 4 .0806 .5124* .4255 1.0000 
1.0000    
.5759* 1.0000   
.5771* .9990*** 1.0000  
2001 Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
Model 4 .7121** .6065** .5886* 1.0000 
1.0000    
-.0994 1.0000   
-.0824 .7984** 1.0000  
2002 Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
Model 4 .4724 -.0283 .1196 1.0000 
1.0000    
-.2633 1.0000   
-.6163** .5166* 1.0000  
2003 Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
Model 4 -.1682 .5751* -.0884 1.0000 
1.0000    
-.0887 1.0000   
-.0858 .9980*** 1.0000  
2004 Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
Model 4 .1759 .8129*** .8197*** 1.0000 
1.0000    
-.1481 1.0000   
-.2151 .9627*** 1.0000  
2005 Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
Model 4 -.0647 .6190** .7405** 1.0000 
1.0000    
.4592 1.0000   
.4553 .9997*** 1.0000  
2006 Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
Model 4 .4176 .8011*** .8059*** 1.0000 
1.0000    
.4317 1.0000   
.4528 .9992*** 1.0000  
2007 Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
Model 4 .0275 .2674 .2633 1.0000 
* significant at the 10%, ** 5%, ***1% 
 
Overall, wide variation in efficiency levels over time with a tendency towards a 
general decline was reflected in all models although there was a lag in some models; larger, 
foreign-owned commercial banks reflected a tendency towards improvement since 2005. An 
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important question is therefore, how do these efficiency scores evolve over time and what 
drives them in the process? Whether these differences will actually translate into changes in 
efficiency ranks is examined in the test for convergence. 
Tests for conditional convergence 
In the second stage of our two-stage approach we seek to identify variables that have a 
significant association with, or that point to, the movements in efficiency and question 
whether the volatility in efficiency scores noted above alters the ranking of the banks’ 
efficiency. We investigate whether the inefficient banks (scores less than 100%) are 
improving and therefore converging on the benchmark or on a cluster of peers. We borrow 
from the growth convergence literature of Barro and Sala- i-Martin (1991) and Sala-i-Martin 
(1996) to test for conditional convergence. Conditional convergence implies that initial 
differences in technical efficiency can create permanent deviations from the benchmark even 
in steady-state. Banks will form into clusters of peer groups and converge on the peer group 
average.  Following Fung (2006) we estimate conditional convergence using panel estimation 
techniques. Equation (1) below describes the basic model. 
   titiitti uTEZTE ,1,,, +++=D -lba      (4) 
Where TE = technical efficiency,  
Z represents categorical and environmental variables, and  
u is a stochastic disturbance.  
 
A negative value of ? is a necessary condition for convergence. The larger the 
absolute value of ?, the faster the speed of convergence. We experimented with a number of 
bank specific and macroeconomic variables. The bank specific variables were the total assets 
of the banks as an indicator of size, cost- income ratio as an accounting measure of 
management efficiency, and net interest margin as an accounting measure of risk 
management efficiency. The rate of growth of GDP was used as a macroeconomic 
environmental variable that affected the banking market as a whole. Categorical variables 
were zero-one dummy variables representing type of specialisation (retail or merchant), 
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ownership (domestic or foreign), the top 3 and the next level (lower 3) banks by asset size in 
each year, and a dummy variable that takes the value of unity from 2002 onwards and zero in 
previous years to allow for a major structural break and change in market structure that 
occurred in that year as discussed above.  
We estimated equation (4) using Generalised Least Squares (GLS)25.  Following strict 
variable deletion testing, the bank specific variables were eliminated on statistical grounds. 
Table 4 below defines the environmental and categorical variables that were used in the final 
results. 
Table 4 Variable description- tests for conditional convergence  
Variable Description Value 
CAT Merchant or retail bank Merchant = 1, 0 otherwise 
OWN Ownership dummy  Foreign = 1, 0 otherwise 
TOP3 Top 3 bank in each year by asset size Top 3 = 1, 0 otherwise 
LOW3 Next lower 3 in each year by asset size LOW 3 = 1, 0 otherwise 
GDP Real GDP growth per year Annual % increase 
LRSIZE Log of assets deflated by CPI  
ACC Cost-income ratio as in equation (1) above  
NIM Net interest margin  
DUM02 Dummy variable 2002 onwards 2002-2007=1, 0 otherwise 
  
Table 5 below presents results for each model which, as described above, measures technical 
efficiency based on alternative output measures. The most important and consistent result to 
focus on is that the lag of technical efficiency is negative and strongly significant in all four 
models. The evidence for conditional convergence is strong, which means that each bank 
possesses its own steady-state efficiency to which it is converging. In other words, 
differences in technical efficiency among the banks can translate into permanent differences. 
One remarkable feature is the magnitude of the coefficient which indicated low or zero 
persistence in the data for efficiency. The absolute value of ? ranged from 0.8 to 1.0 
indicating a remarkably rapid speed of adjustment (80-100%) to the steady state in one year. 
The second consistent result is that the cost- income ratio (lagged) shows a consistent 
negative relationship with technical efficiency. The higher the cost- income ratio in the 
                                                 
25 Pre-testing of the model showed that fixed effects could be rejected on a standard F test in favour of pooled. 
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previous year, the lower the level of technical efficiency (and by implication, the higher is 
cost inefficiency). The role of the cost- income ratio suggests that there is information content 
in the measure as an indicator of efficiency but it is only partial. As we can see, from Table 5 
other factors are also related to technical efficiency. 
Table 5 Short-run tests for conditional convergence in technical efficiency by models  1999-2007 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 131.1 (.000)*** 137.0 (.000)*** 135.5 (.000)*** 120.8 (.000)*** 
TEt-1 -.870 (.000)*** -1.17 (.000)*** -1.07 (.000)*** -1.04 (.000)*** 
GDP growth 3.41 (.065)* -3.44 (.017)** -2.83 (.093)* -4.32 (.024)** 
LRSIZE -9.36 (.000)*** -3.55 (.015)** -4.36 (.010)*** -3.97 (.193) 
ACC(-1) -.174 (.079)* -.239 (.008)*** -.228 (.008)*** -.144 (.155) 
NIM(-1) -69.2 (.062)* - - - 
OWN - -18.0 (.000)*** -17.9 (.000)*** -22.6 (.001)*** 
TOP3 17.4 (.013)** 31.3 (.003)*** 31.1 (.002)*** 12.4 (.291) 
LOW3 - 19.1 (.005)*** 18.3 (.006)*** -7.49 (.336) 
DUM02 19.8 (.000)*** -17.5 (.000)*** -20.0 (.001)*** - 
Log L* -382.9 -378.0 -374.7 -387.5 
Note: GLS panel estimation, heteroskedastic adjusted standard errors, p-values in parentheses 
 
Third, size is associated with a lower level of efficiency, so that in general the larger 
the bank the lower the level of efficiency. But, allowing for size generally, the top 3 banks 
(which are also foreign owned banks) are associated with higher levels of efficiency.  
Other factors produced mixed associations with the level of technical efficiency. The 
dummy variable for 2002 onwards was always significant but did not have a consistent effect.  
As with some results for the frontier analysis, the distinction is between model 1 and all the 
other models.26  The rate of growth of GDP had a positive association with technical 
efficiency in model 1, where output is a weighted combination of revenues but has a negative 
association with output made up of a combination of interest earning assets, which suggests 
that the inefficient banks slip behind the best-practice banks by 3 to 9 percentage points for 
each one-percent growth in GDP.  The categorical variables show that the ownership variable 
is relatively more important, suggesting that foreign-owned banks achieve less technical 
                                                 
26We also experimented with using two dummy variables: the 2002 dummy along with another taking the value of unity 
from 2005 onwards with zero in all previous years to examine for the influence of apparent structural breaks. For all models 
except model 1, the inclusion of the second dummy variable had no effect on the final model as the dummy was early 
eliminated.  For model 1, the estimated coefficients for the lagged dependent variable and the categorical dummy are quite 
robust to the addition of this variable, but the significance of this dummy variable resulted in the elimination of the dummy 
for 2002 onwards and a reduction in the log likelihood. This implies that for model 1each dummy variable at least partly 
captures influential characteristics related to the other.  
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efficiency than their local counterparts. The positive and significant coefficients for the Top 3 
variable suggest that larger banks are able to achieve a higher level of technical efficiency 
even being foreign- owned; the results for the lower 3 banks were significant but inconsistent. 
The one period lagged net interest margin (NIM) had a significant association with technical 
efficiency only in the case of model 1. The negative coefficient suggests that technically 
inefficient banks are associated with wider spreads than more efficient banks, when revenue 
represents the output of the bank.  Evidently, bank-specific factors have a significant 
influence on the convergence of technical efficiency. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Motivated by the potential impact of recent events on Jamaica’s critical banking 
sector, this paper has presented a number of models for measuring individual bank efficiency 
in Jamaica.  Frontier models show that the use of the bootstrapping technique mitigates bias 
and therefore show superiority in favour of the bootstrapping technique over the standard 
DEA.  There were wide fluctuations in efficiency levels over the period 1998 to 2007 with a 
trend towards improvement since 2005 for the larger, foreign-owned commercial banks. The 
result of greater efficiency among large foreign-owned banks is in sympathy with the 
literature (see, for example Bonin et al, 2005). In fact, Elyasiani and Rezvanian (2002) note 
the importance of acknowledging this distinction between local and foreign banks 
particularly where the presence of foreign banks is significant as is increasingly the case for 
Jamaica. 
The inclusion of the non-performing loans as a bad output produced more telling 
results than mere its inclusion or exclusion. In general, efficiency levels declined significantly 
when the bad output is introduced.  With the introduction of IFRS, International Accounting 
Standard (IAS) 39 mandates guidelines and a rigorous approach to credit provisioning which 
must be observed. This increases the difficulty for banks to go undetected with under-
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provisioning as with previous accounting requirements.  In line with expectations, the post-
IFRS results appear to be more transparent and to better reflect the true economic value of 
assets and liabilities.  
The tests for conditional convergence in this study suggest that the steady-state 
convergence is predicated on the macroeconomic state and some firm-specific variables. 
Overall, the results point to the GDP growth and ownership as the main influences on bank 
efficiency, with business focus (commercial or merchant) and size also having a major 
influence in some models. The rapid speed of adjustment indicated that Jamaican banks 
converge quickly to their peer cluster. While there is significant influence from the apparent 
structural break in 2002, the effect is unclear. Obviously, the evidence of structural breaks in 
2002 and, possibly, 2005 has had discernable effect on bank performance, although the 
precise impact should be investigated as part of future research.  
Issues regarding bank efficiency are of particular interest in Jamaica where there 
banks compete for a share of the small, open market.  A bank’s response to market conditions 
is likely to be better the more efficiently that bank operates. Reliable information about  the 
level of efficiency and changes to these levels over time will assist bankers in determining 
how to ‘bundle,’ price, and market banking services.  Furthermore, any long-term impact on 
bank profitability is likely to have relevance to customer welfare and economic development 
and therefore to policymakers in a wider sense.  The results from this paper inform an 
exercise in measurement that may be used to improve managerial performance by 
highlighting banks that score high on best practices and also to address research issues such 
as the variation in efficiency based on different definitions of output. It is therefore useful for 
policymakers at both the micro and the macro levels.  These results must be considered in 
relation to other factors such as banks’ productivity and the impact of accounting measures 
on reported financial data that are used to impute efficiency levels in frontier analysis.  
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Obviously, improvement in efficiency will require purposeful, consistent and proactive 
management supported by appropriate and adequate regulation. 
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Appendix A: Efficiency Scores by Model – DEA and Bootstrap Compared 
                     
 Model 1  Model 2   Model 3  Model 4  
                     
 DEA 
Bstrap 
Bias- 
corrected 
Lower  
bound 
Upper 
bound  DEA 
Bstrap 
Bias- 
corrected 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound  DEA 
Bstrap 
Bias- 
corrcted 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound  DEA 
Bstrap 
Bias- 
corrected 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound  
                     
1998                     
                     
FGB 93.08* 84.33 59.58 91.95  100.0* 91.09 60.98 99.68  100.0* 93.37 73.46 99.71  74.98* 70.56 58.69 74.51  
BNS 73.05* 64.35 38.64 72.26  100.0* 93.13 79.99 99.54  100.0* 93.39 76.04 99.78  70.54* 64.06 45.19 70.14  
CCMB 42.24* 34.24 10.88 41.69  100.0* 90.52 60.18 99.66  100.0* 93.21 72.49 99.69  100.0* 78.78 27.91 99.10  
FCIB 71.90* 65.82 45.51 71.18  61.78* 57.98 47.40 61.57  67.66* 64.60 56.44 67.49  52.93* 50.31 41.96 52.64  
CIBC MB 100.0* 64.84 1.12 98.52  65.37* 62.30 54.35 65.10  71.68* 69.04 62.27 71.49  66.49* 63.29 52.93 66.16  
CITIBANK 58.47* 52.76 34.79 57.94  67.55* 63.99 54.71 67.35  74.80* 71.39 62.38 74.67  46.68* 43.51 33.40 46.37  
CITI MB 100.0* 59.43 0.00 98.37  100.0* 90.36 57.87 99.61  100.0* 93.36 72.00 99.76  100.0* 78.08 0.00 99.23  
MAN MB 100.0* 73.73 0.00 98.04  100.0* 90.31 58.39 99.59  100.0* 93.19 73.12 99.74  79.20* 69.73 42.95 78.90  
NCB 41.69* 37.38 24.81 41.21  88.48* 83.96 71.08 88.26  89.06* 85.55 75.96 88.87  85.52* 80.62 64.49 85.11  
PCMB 100.0* 59.87 0.00 98.13  100.0* 90.85 64.41 99.57  100.0 93.31 71.55 99.75  100.0* 79.14 3.38 99.33  
RBTT 44.16* 40.43 28.37 43.72  82.44* 77.32 64.53 82.14  79.96* 76.34 66.01 79.73  79.19* 75.37 62.89 78.80  
2007                     
                     
FGB 90.83* 86.99 75.23 90.63  100.0* 83.97 21.60 99.43  100.0* 83.44 19.06 99.39  100.0* 65.79 0.00 97.47  
BNS 100.0* 94.69 82.34 99.75  65.22* 59.20 43.35 64.80  65.44* 59.61 43.81 64.91  51.70* 40.02 10.64 50.91  
CCMB 86.15* 83.54 74.59 86.03  100.0* 83.56 39.87 99.43  100.0* 84.67 45.36 99.45  100.0* 70.33 5.10 96.97  
FCIB 75.29* 72.52 64.35 75.11  96.57* 88.06 56.87 96.09  95.99* 87.27 57.07 95.57  48.66* 35.14 4.30 47.95  
CITIBANK 67.02* 64.44 56.25 66.88  40.84* 37.19 25.86 40.62  40.92* 37.24 26.09 40.73  36.28* 30.51 11.90 36.04  
NCB 93.44* 89.66 78.71 93.20  70.68* 63.56 40.78 70.30  71.12* 64.51 42.52 70.82  70.16* 59.14 22.96 69.73  
PCMB 100.0* 94.38 73.50 99.78  100.0 83.87 9.98 99.44  100.0* 84.41 11.88 99.28  100.0* 22.12 0.00 97.78  
RBTT 100.0* 94.36 74.11 99.76  100.0* 91.71 68.50 99.33  100.0* 91.92 69.24 99.18  77.76* 65.71 25.80 76.97  
MF&G 100.0* 94.25 73.74 99.79  81.15* 75.07 56.31 80.68  82.53* 76.27 58.26 82.05  4.58* 3.85 1.48 4.54  
*Significant bias at 95% 
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